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4  Stopping Inflation 
Brazilian inflation is a problem that predates the current debt overhang. Figure 
4.1 provides some recent history. In the five years between  1959 and  1964, 
increasingly populist administrations carried inflation from 10 to 100 percent. 
By 1968 it was down to 20 percent, a level that persisted until the first oil 
shock, when inflation jumped to 40 percent. There it remained until 1979. In 
the five years between 1980 and 1985, the government's failure to absorb the 
debt and oil shocks in a noninflationary manner pushed inflation from 50 to 
220 percent. On 28 February  1986, with inflation at 400 percent per year, 
Brazil embarked on its second major stabilization effort in twenty-five years. 
In this chapter we highlight the main  features of  the  Brazilian  inflation 
process and contrast the two stabilization efforts. The dynamics of  Brazilian 
inflation is best understood by  recognizing the interaction of  supply shocks 
and indexation as  the  main elements in  generating acceleration. The two 
stabilization  efforts  demonstrate  that  an  incomes  policy  is  an  essential 
ingredient to nonrecessionary stabilization. But they also show that demand 
restraint  is  indispensable if  disinflation is  to  be  viable  and  that  external 
conditions make a difference. The  1964 program was gradualist and relied 
on  wage  repression  to  prevent  cost  forces  from  pressing  on  prices. 
Stabilization  was  non-neutral  in  its  distributional  impact.  It  was  also 
conducted without concern for debt or the balance of  payments. The  1986 
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plan  was  a  heterodox  shock  treatment  centered  around  a  continuing  price 
freeze and paid insufficient attention to excess demand and the need for fiscal 
restraint.  Supply  was  constrained  by  continuing  large  resource  transfers 
abroad. 
Our closer analysis of  the two stabilization programs  is preceded  by  the 
presentation of  a basic model of inertial inflation in the next section. 
Public-sector  of 
prices  living 
Industrial prices 
4.1  Inertial Inflation 
Money expansion and velocity behavior are not enough to explain inflation 
dynamics  in Brazil. There is little doubt that, from the demand  side, large 
budget  deficits  in  1959-64  and  1979-85  supported  the  inflation  process. 
But  assigning  them  more  than  an  accommodating  role  would  mean 
neglecting the important contribution of the supply side to inflation and the 
mechanics of its propagation. 
Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979) have drawn attention to the persistence 
of  price disturbances in a setting of overlapping,  long-term wage contracts 
even  under  forward-looking,  rational  expectations  behavior  and  a  well- 
understood  program  of  monetary  control.  In  the  Brazilian  setting,  institu- 
tional factors have taken, to a large extent, the place of the relative wage and 
expectations  mechanisms  that  characterize  Fischer-Taylor  contracts.  From 
1968 on,  mandatory  indexation  has  been  backward  looking, periodically 
readjusting  wages  and  other contracts  on the  basis  of  recent  experience. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates how the Brazilian indexation system worked  between 
1968 and 1986: while the wage legislation corrected wages for past inflation, 
the exchange rate was readjusted in short intervals by mini-devaluations, and 
interest rates, bonds, and rents were corrected for price increases through  a 
system of  indexation called monetary  correction. 
Assuming that prices are determined by costs, current inflation depends on 
past inflation via indexation of wages,  the exchange rate, and public sector 
prices. The output gap or unemployment  affects current inflation because it 
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influences the marginal costs of firms to the extent that the turnover of  the 
labor force can be used to offset wage adjustment. Independent internal and 
external factors such as harvests, terms of trade, etc., also have an influence. 
Combining the effects of indexation, unemployment, and supply shocks, we 
write the inflation process as: 
(4.1)  pi = a pi-1 + b GAP, + e, 
where p is the rate of inflation, GAP is a measure of excess demand, and e is 
an indicator of supply shocks. 
Equation  (4.1) shows  that  indexing  plays  a  central role  in  projecting 
past price increases into the future. Where such a process has long been 
operative, the role of  nominal demand in stopping inflation is weak relative 
to  the  replicative  effects of  formal  indexation. Moreover,  any  escalation 
of  prices from supply shocks gets permanently embedded in the inflation 
rate. 
The implications of  this  inflation process  are worthwhile emphasizing. 
First, current supply shocks are automatically transmitted to future periods. 
A real depreciation, elimination of  public sector subsidies, or increases in 
the price of  oil or in indirect taxes or in the real price of  agricultural goods 
raise  the  current rate of  inflation and  are  transmitted via  indexation  into 
increased inflation in subsequent periods. In fact, in order to raise real prices 
or  cut  real  wages  in  the  presence  of  full  indexation,  the  frequency  of 
adjustment of exchange rates and public sector prices has to be greater than 
the frequency of  wage adjustments. Only then is it possible to defeat the 
indexation, cutting the average real wage during the adjustment period by 
stepping up the rate of  inflation. Indexation of  the financial system, the tax 
structure, and the public debt means that changes in the inflation rate are 
automatically and fully accommodated. 
Second,  a  slowdown  in  the  growth  rate  of  nominal  spending  cannot 
eliminate inflation from one day to the next. Demand-side policies do not 
eliminate the cost-inflation captured in the lagged inflation term of equation 
(4.1).  The neoclassical answer, which  is to  instantaneously recontract the 
labor force with reduced wages in the face of  a shift to a noninflationary 
monetary regime, is implausible. The presence of  inertia is thus a central 
reason  for  incomes  policy  in  a  stabilization program.  Otherwise,  only 
through significant recession can inflation be affected. Statistical estimates of 
the tradeoff in the Brazilian case show large output costs for small reductions 
in inflation. 
Third,  any  escalation of  inflation  initiated  by  some  supply  shock  is 
supported by  further  accommodating endogenous elements that  feed  the 
inflation process. One element is the increase in  the velocity of  money in 
response to increases in inflation; another is the inflationary erosion of  tax 
revenue.  The larger fiscal deficit then implies increased rates of  monetary 
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Fourth, the inertia of the inflation process implies that contracts that are not 
explicitly indexed in a backward-looking way, such as short-term loans in the 
financial system, cany forward-looking inflation adjustments. At any point in 
time, a given stock of such contracts are outstanding. Their maturity may run 
as  long  as  six  months  or  one year.  Sudden  disinflation,  by  contradicting 
expectations,  would result in an arbitrary redistribution between debtors and 
creditors. 
Finally, an important contributing factor to acceleration of inflation is the 
mounting pressure to shorten the interval for inflation adjustment of  wages, 
public sector prices, and the exchange rate. 
In  high-inflation  economies,  institutional  arrangements  provide  for  a 
periodical resetting of  real wages to a peak. The peak real wage occurs at the 
date  of  the  contract  immediately  after  the  nominal  wage  increase. 
Subsequently, up to the next adjustment, the real wage is eroded by inflation. 
Figure 4.3 shows the  actual real  minimum  wage in  Brazil  over the  period 
1976-86.  At fixed intervals,  the real wage increases to a peak and then  is 
eroded over the interval between adjustments, reaching a trough just prior to 
the next adjustment,  a year or six months later. 
Because  the  average  real  wage  declines  with  higher  rates  of  inflation, 
increases in inflation provoke demands for shorter periods of adjustment to 
prevent  adverse  distributional  effects.  This  shortening  of  the  adjustment 
interval in turn increases inflation: in a context of overlapping contracts,  the 
shortening  of  the  intervals  means  that  a  larger  number  of  contracts  are 
revised on the same date, pushing up costs and hence inflation. Escalation of 
inflation to three or four digits invariably involves a shortening of adjustment 
periods for wage and price setting. 
In  1979  the  annual  adjustment  of  wages  in  Brazil  was  moved  to  a 
twice-yearly base. This translated into a supply shock for firms, as discussed 
in  chapter  3.  Given the  large  devaluation,  discrete  adjustments  in  public 
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prices,  and the rise in real prices of  agricultural products,  all at the  same 
time, it is not surprising that inflation rates doubled. Higher inflation in turn 
further shortened intervals, thereby pushing inflation up  once more. By the 
end of  1985, firms and workers were beginning to move toward cycles of 
only three months. The government, keenly aware that the transition to ever 
shorter periods would have hyperinflationary consequences, tried to prevent 
the generalized legal requirement of  three-month intervals. Eventually more 
dramatic action  was  needed  and  occurred  in  the  form  of  the  wage-price 
freeze of March 1986. 
Before we discuss the heterodox shock, however, it is useful to consider 
the stabilization program of  1965 -  68. 
4.2  Inflation and Stabilization in the Mid-Sixties 
Our  story  begins  in  the  early  sixties.  The  main  reason  for  the  sharp 
increase in inflation between 1959 and 1962 was a rapid increase in demand. 
Brazil was  undergoing  a  surge in  growth driven by  the  internal market. 
Between 1957 and  1962, industrial output grew at 11 percent per year. The 
share of  the central government budget deficit in output increased from 2.8 
percent in  1960 to 4.3  in  1963, while the share of  seignorage in  GDP to 
finance it widened from 3.6 percent in 1959 to 5.7 in 1962. The combination 
of  a  30 percent  deterioration of  the  terms  of  trade,  the  lack  of  external 
financing, a bad coffee crop in 1963, and adverse climatic conditions leading 
to an  agriculture disaster in  1964 contributed to the inflation problem from 
the side of supply. 
The economic crisis  was  the  vehicle for a  military  takeover in  March 
1964. The  Progruma  de Ac&o EconBmicu  do  Govern0  (PAEG,  1964166) 
detailed a plan to reduce inflation gradually in three years using fiscal and 
monetary restraint along with incomes policy. The following were the main 
aspects of the program: 
(a)  Sounder fiscal policies led to a gradual reduction in the deficit from 4.2 
percent of GDP in 1963 to only 1 percent in 1966. The main instruments 
of  this budget balancing were increases in public sector prices, cuts in 
subsidies,  increased  tax  collections  obtained  through  an  increase  in 
indirect taxes, and better administration to avoid tax evasion. Despite the 
initial  increase  in  wages  for  the  military  and  civil  servants  and  an 
increase in investment expenditures after 1965, the deficit was reduced. 
Later on, the reduction of real wages also helped the budget. 
(b)  The  exchange rate  was devalued by  70 percent  at the  outset of  the 
program  to  deal  with  the  external  imbalance.  Outstanding debt  was 
rescheduled and a large program of external assistance was begun. 
(c)  Monetary policy was erratic. An initial moderate expansion in 1964 was 
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was used to mobilize domestic saving and to create a market for public 
sector debt. The black market premium that had reached 60 percent in 
the last quarter of  1963 was already down to 4 percent by  the end of 
1964 and oscillated below 1 percent in 1965 and 1966. 
(d)  Incomes policy took the form of  granting wage increases, not in  line 
with  past  inflation but rather geared to  “expected  inflation”  and past 
average, not peak, wages. In terms of the inflation model described in 
equation (4.1), disinflation was achieved by breaking the link between 
current and past  inflation.  Wage adjustments became forward looking 
and limited to an officially imposed, and optimistic, inflation forecast. 
But the reduction in price inflation fell short, by a wide margin, of  the 
anticipated decline built into wage agreements. The effect was to reduce 
real wages, although the original claim had been that real wages would 
remain  constant;  that  is,  smaller  nominal  adjustment  would  be 
compensated by  lower  inflation.  The  real  minimum  wage  fell by  15 
percent  between  1964 and  1967. The  wage  cut  made room  both  for 
budget balancing and for improved external competitiveness, while at 
the same time bankrolling a cut in the rate of  inflation. 
(e)  On the price side, the government introduced a program of fiscal, credit, 
and other incentives to firms that agreed not to raise prices by more than 
a stated percentage. Allowable cost increases excluded wage awards in 
excess of those contemplated in the government wage formula. In  1966 
firms were promised a 20 percent reduction in excise taxes if they carried 
out wage increases in accordance with the government wage formula. 
From 1967 on, price guidelines became more pervasive, falling on most 
large industrial firms. 
This program was successful in reducing inflation without generating a 
dramatic decline in economic activity. Inflation declined from 144 percent in 
the first quarter of  1964 to 57 percent in  1965, and then to 38 percent in 
1966. Industrial production declined in the first year of  stabilization by  5 
percent, but then showed a rapid recovery. By  1966 it was already 6 percent 
above the pre-crisis level. 
In  1968 a new  strategy of  stimulating demand and living with  modest 
inflation  was  adopted.  First,  a  crawling  peg  exchange  rate  policy  was 
introduced to maintain stable real exchange rates and avoid the variability 
consequent upon  discrete devaluations, thus extending indexing. Second, 
credit became more abundant. Third, in response to public reaction against 
the wage squeeze, the government revised the wage adjustment rule. The 
new formula corrected half of  any underestimation of  future inflation. Real 
minimum  wages  continued  to  fall  until  1970,  when  inflation  rates  had 
stabilized at  a lower level.  A new  formula was  introduced in  1974 after 
inflation  rates  started  up  again.  Wage  readjustment then  returned  to  the 
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The reforms of  1965-68  were the basis for an extended period of  strong 
growth with stable inflation. Between 1968 and 1973, real growth averaged 
10 percent per year and inflation declined to only 20 percent. After 1974 and 
the joint effect of external shocks and domestic overheating, inflation started 
to increase again, as discussed in chapter 2. 
4.3 
The Cruzado Plan stopped inflation in March 1986. Less than a year later, 
in  January  1987, interest  rates  were  soaring  and  the  economy  was  in 
disarray. Uncertainty was  pervasive,  fueled not  only by  the  return of  the 
three-digit inflation rate but also by the feeling that the government had lost 
control over the economy. In this section we describe the Cruzado Plan,* and 
in the next one we examine the factors that contributed to its failure, despite 
its clever design and appropriateness. 
In  February  1986 monthly  inflation had  reached an  annual rate of  400 
percent. Inflation escalation had  become severe with the second oil shock 
and  the  shortening  of  the  intervals  for  wage  setting,  and  was  further 
accelerated in  1983 with  the combination of  a  large real  devaluation, an 
agricultural disaster, and increased prices in the public sector together with 
reduced subsidies. It was held in place at the expense of a major recession in 
1983, as discussed in chapter 3. After a modest recovery in 1984, the new 
democratic government embarked on a program of expansion in  1985 that 
carried real growth to 8 percent. Another bad crop introduced supply shocks 
which,  combined  with  the  increase  in  economic  activity,  led  to  rising 
inflation. As noted earlier, workers’ concern over the erosion of  real wages 
created new  demand for shortening the interval for inflation adjustment to 
only three months. Some private firms acceded. Mindful of  the dangers of 
inflation  acceleration,  and  with  elections  coming  later  in  the  year,  the 
government had little choice but to embark on a bold program of heterodox 
stabilization via incomes policy rather than recession. 
The decision did not come as a surprise. Plans for inflation stabilization 
which tackled the critical difficulty of  inertia had been widely discussed in 
Brazil  for more  than  a  year.  The Argentine and  Israeli precedents  were 
evidence that such plans were practical. 
Policymakers believed that past inflationary shocks were being perpetu- 
ated  in  a vicious  circle created by  indexation. Freezing prices,  exchange 
rates, and wages would create a rupture with the past, thus permitting the 
economy to rid itself of inertial inflation. 
The  main  obstacle to  the  price  and  wage  freeze  was  the  absence  of 
synchronization in price readjustments. In 1986 the typical wage contract ran 
for six months, with  different groups of  wage earners receiving readjust- 
ments at different points in time. Rent contracts ran for either one year or six 
months. Government bonds were readjusted monthly. Simply freezing wages 
Inflation and Stabilization in the Mid-Eighties 312  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
and  prices  on  a  given  day  would  greatly  favor  wage  earners  and 
entrepreneurs who had readjusted their prices immediately before the freeze. 
In a like manner, such a step would  drastically punish those who were to 
have  received  their  new  settlements the  following  day.  Others  would  be 
located along a spectrum whose midpoint would correspond to average real 
wages  and  prices;  their  position  would  depend  upon  how  recently  their 
nominal wage had been adjusted. 
The arbitrary choice of  any particular day for a freeze would establish an 
unsustainable structure of prices and wages.  This situation is illustrated in 
figure 4.4,  which shows the main features of wage settlements in Brazil: the 
semiannual  periodicity  of  readjustments,  the  staggered  dates  of  readjust- 
ments,  and  the  institutionalization of  previous  wage peaks.  Recontracting 
with full past indexation restores the previous peak of the real wage at the 
beginning of each period. As prices increase, the real wage is reduced during 
the  next  six  months  until  it  reaches  bottom  on  the  day  before  the  new 
contract takes effect. The figure shows the behavior of the real wage for six 
different groups of  workers. The first group contracts in January and July, 
the second in February and August, and so forth. One can see that in each 
month three groups have their real wages above the mean and three others 
have theirs below it. Clearly, some workers can enjoy for sometime a real 
wage above the mean only because the wages of others are below it. 
Freezing wages  at any  one point in time  would  benefit  workers  whose 
wages were above the mean and hurt those with wages below. To avoid this 
problem, the freeze has to be done in such a way that all wages are restored 
to  their  average  real  levels.  The  new  currency  facilitated  differential 
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Fig. 4.4  Real wages for six groups of workers with staggered contracts 
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well as conversion of  other contracts. Cruzeiro amounts were converted to 
cruzados (a new  currency, with  1,000 cruzeiros per cruzado) according to 
specific tables. This translation, along with the coordination of  all income 
recipients, were the central points of the new program. 
The key steps of the Cruzado Plan were the following: 
Wages were readjusted and frozen. Contracts with several months to go 
before the regular readjustment were augmented, and contracts that had 
experienced a recent readjustment were rolled back. As a sweetener, the 
minimum wage was increased by  15 percent over its past real average, 
while workers who were paid over the minimum received an 8 percent 
bonus. 
Rents and installment payments were converted into cruzados using their 
average real value during the previous twelve months and frozen at that 
level for one year. 
All prices and the exchange rate were frozen until further notice. 
A tablita was devised to compensate for the expected inflation built into 
extant contracts and thus avoid arbitrary redistribution between debtors 
and creditors. The new currency, the cruzado, was introduced to help 
facilitate  the  readjustment.  Starting  on  3  March  1986, the  cruzeiro 
would  depreciate at  the  rate  of  0.45 percent  per  day  relative to  the 
cruzado. 
Indexation, which was central to  the process  of  inertial inflation was 
virtually eliminated. An escalu move1 (sliding scale), with a 20 percent 
threshold, was  substituted for wages. In financial markets, indexation 
was maintained only for instruments of  more than one-year maturity. 
There  was  a  sharp initial monetization of  the  economy  to  avoid  the 
Argentine problem of  exceptionally high real interest rates. In the first 
three  months  following  stabilization,  the  monetary  base  doubled. 
Monetary demand was accommodated with the expectation that it was 
for the purpose of  restructuring the composition of  financial assets. 
On the fiscal side, the tax reform of December 1985 was thought to have 
laid much of  the  groundwork for stabilization. The expected revenue 
gains were calculated to close a budget deficit of 6 percent of GDP. The 
operational deficit in  1986 was projected to be zero. 
External factors favored the  program  in  three respects. The decline in 
world interest rates reduced the burden of the debt service in the government 
budget and in the balance of payments. Sharply lower world oil prices made 
a major contribution in  the  same direction since oil made up 45  percent 
of  imports.  Dollar depreciation in  the  early  part  of  the  program  helped 
provide a gain in Brazilian competitiveness despite a fixed exchange rate, 
Thus, the program was well timed from the vantage point of the international 
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4.4  What Went Wrong? 
Between February  and  June,  cumulative inflation was  zero.  Industrial 
production increased by  12 percent in  the  first half-year of  the  program 
relative to  the  same period  a year before.  Between  June and  November, 
however, the program took on a life of its own. Fuelled by  strong popular 
support  for  the  price  freeze,  Finance  Minister  Dilson  Funaro  elevated 
controls to a fetish. The budget was allowed to deteriorate dramatically, the 
trade surplus disappeared, shortages and black markets became pervasive. 
But  “zero  inflation”  remained the ministerial obsession.  Only one inter- 
vening  and  inadequate adjustment was  attempted in  July  to raise indirect 
tax receipts. 
Among the factors leading to the failure of the Cruzado Plan, the most 
prominent was  the  overheating of  the  economy  as  a  result of  expansive 
wage, monetary, and fiscal policies. 
Money  growth had  already  started  to  accelerate ahead of  inflation in 
August 1985, as shown in table 4.1. The government turned to expansion of 
the monetary base rather than increases in internal debt to finance its deficit. 
As  real  interest  rates  net  of  taxes  turned  negative,  economic  agents 
rearranged their portfolios in favor of consumer durables, stimulating output 
growth, and in favor of real estate, pushing up the price of land (figure 4.5). 
Money  growth further accelerated after March  1986, as  policymakers 
recognized the need to remonetize the economy following disinflation. Price 
stability, along  with  an  end  to  the  inflation  tax,  suddenly increases  the 
demand for real balances. Real interest rates turn sharply positive unless the 
government engages in a significant monetization. But it is difficult to know 
how much is enough. One criterion is the level of the real interest rate, the 
other,  the  behavior of  monetary  aggregates.  It  is  difficult  to  judge  the 
Table 4.1  Real Money Stock and  Real Interest Rates, Quarterly  Average, 1984-86 
Real Money  Stock 
(millions of  March 1986 cruzados)  Real Interest Rate Net of  Taxes 
(percent per year on CDs of 
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Fig. 4.5  Average real estate prices in SPo Wulo, 1977-87  (in real dollars 
per M2) 
appropriate level of  real balances because financial adaptation to inflation 
partially  destroys  traditional  linkages  between  interest  rates  and  real 
balances.  The  stability  of  demand  for  money  under  such  discontinuous 
change is dubious. But being too conservative is problematic because high 
real  interest rates  in  the  presence of  a  large public  debt  create a  fiscal 
problem. With hindsight one can argue that monetary growth proceeded too 
fast to assure price stability. 
Part  of  the  problem  was  that  low  interest rates  permitted  firms  lacking 
confidence in  the program  to  build  up  speculative stocks in  anticipation of 
removal of the price freeze. The signs of excess demand and repressed inflation 
started to pile up, but the policymakers  preferred to deny the evidence rather than 
to give up the fetish of zero inflation for more realistic policies. 
The next point concerns fiscal policy. Tax revenues rose disappointingly 
little due to two features of the tax legislation approved in December 1985: 
a  lowered  income-tax-withholding schedule and  an  increased reliance on 
taxation of  financial assets no longer widely held. Revenues of  state-owned 
companies were hurt by the price freeze, spending ran higher than anticipated, 
and  subsidies that were cut during  1983-84  have since surged back.  The 
public sector wage bill increased in line with the economywide trend. 
Must the budget be strictly zero, or even in surplus, for monetary reform 
to  succeed? Or is it possible to  finance a  small deficit in  a noninflation- 
ary manner? To  a large extent this depends on the growth rate of output, 
the prospective path of real tax revenues, and the real rate of interest. If out- 
put growth is high and the real rate of  interest is negligible, there is room 
for  small  deficits.  But  the  aftermath of  the  Cruzado Plan  indicates that 316  Eliana A. Cardoso and Albert Fishlow 
public budget  deficits in  Brazil  were  too  large  to  be  sustainable without 
accelerating prices. The inflation tax was still necessary to finance planned 
outlays. 
The third issue relates to wage policy. In terms of equation (4. l), the key 
point of the program was to eliminate catch-up inflation in prices and wages. 
This was done by the offsetting influences of  rolling some contracts back and 
others up. Thus inertial inflation was simply suspended. But the real wage 
was  increased,  the  cost  of  which was  borne by  a  reduction in  the  profit 
margins of price-controlled firms. 
The increase in real wages promoted by  the Cruzado Plan and ratified by 
the fast-growing economy sustained a consumer boom. During the first six 
months of  1986, retail sales increased 20  percent compared to the first six 
months of  1985, a year during which real GDP had increased by  8 percent. 
By  July  it  was  already obvious that  the  economy was  overheated.  Acute 
shortages, especially of  meat and milk, commanded the headlines of  every 
newspaper. Black markets for all sorts of  goods started to flourish. Supply 
restrictions, to force price changes, aggravated the situation. 
Minor  adjustments  in  the  program  were  made  in  late  July  through 
increases in very special excise taxes. They were claimed to be large enough 
to  solve the budget problem,  yet  small enough to be  eliminated from the 
official price index to keep from influencing the wage trigger. Credibility of 
the plan started to dwindle. 
The government promise to maintain the price freeze contributed to their 
landslide election victory in November. It was immediately followed, how- 
ever, by a second round of much larger excise tax increases, whose objective 
was  to  raise  4  percent  of  GDP  in  revenue.  The package  included  price 
increases of  100 percent  on  beer  and  cigarettes,  and  an  80 percent price 
increase on cars and car parts. This latter increase, on top of the 30 percent 
increase  in  July,  turned  Brazilian  cars  from  the  cheapest  into  the  most 
expensive in the world. 
Once again the government tried to eliminate these excise tax  increases 
from  the  price  index  on  the  grounds  that  the  products  did  not  enter 
low-income  expenditure  baskets,  but  this  time  they  encountered  strong 
resistance.  The  government  was  implicitly  trying  to  reenact  the  1964 
program of real wage cuts to restore the external balance and the budget. But 
the absence of fiscal austerity and the constraints of  a democratic regime put 
severe limits on such an exercise. 
The November  reforms  also reintroduced  partial  indexation,  creating  a 
new  system of  daily  corrections  of  the  exchange  rate  and  tying  interest 
payments  on  savings  accounts  and  other  financial  instruments  to  the 
short-term interest rate. It was a harbinger of what was to come. In February 
1987 the prohibition of indexation for contracts of maturity shorter than one 
year was abolished. Brazil once again had to live with inflation, but under 
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4.5  Comparing Two Experiments 
During the 1964 stabilization the preceding high inflation with no index- 
ation had reduced the real value of the public debt to less than 4 percent of 
GDP (figure 4.6). In the 1986 stabilization, by contrast, prevailing indexation 
and  high real  interest rates had  left a significant handicap of  a combined 
debvincome ratio of foreign and domestic debt of  50 percent. The large debt 
and  insufficient  budget  improvement led  to  expectations  of  a  need  for 
inflationary finance.  Rising  nominal  interest rates  and  a  widening black 
market premium registered signals of doubt about the viability of the program. 
By  January  1987,  inflationary  expectations had  become  extreme. The 
removal of  long adjustment lags in  wages, which previously had  been  an 
element  of  short-term  stability  in  anchoring  price  increases,  meant  that 
inflation could accelerate dramatically. This possibility was reinforced by the 
escala move1 which potentially could put wage adjustments into the express 
lane. Under such an arrangement, the frequency of adjustment becomes very 
sensitive  to  the  inflation  rate  and  feeds  back  upon  it.  Self-fulfilling 
prophecies did not take long to verify themselves. In February the freeze was 
formally removed  and  prices  exploded.  Although the  exchange rate  was 
being devalued on a daily basis by then, the black market for dollars stood at 
a premium of more than 100 percent. The short-term interest rate reached 33 
percent per month. 
Seeing the two Brazilian stabilization programs together teaches three key 
lessons. First, incomes policy is a valuable means for achieving disinflation. 
I 
Fig. 4.6  Net debt of the public sector as a percentage of GDP 
Notes:  1945-64:  Total  debt  (external  and  domestic)  of  central  and  local  governments 
(Goldsmith  1986). 1982-86:  Net debt of  the public sector including public enterprises (Banco 
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It helps avoid dramatic unemployment. But incomes policy by  itself is not 
enough. Without careful fiscal policy, the disinflation is not viable. With a 
boom, price stability is very temporary. Moreover, incomes policy is difficult 
to implement in a neutral fashion. In 1964 wage repression was part of  the 
price  for  disinflation.  In  1986  there  was  a  redistribution  from  firms  to 
workers implicit in the rise in real wages. But firms were able to react to 
defend themselves and, in the process, made the price freeze an increasingly 
costly option. 
The second lesson concerns indexation. Indexation in the presence of supply 
shocks is a source of  inflation propagation. But it also dampens the shocks. An 
economy with long adjustment periods has an inflation process that is protected 
against rapid acceleration. Indexation of assets reinforces the element of stability. 
In  the  1964 episode, indexation was reinforced and broadened. In  1986, by 
contrast, it was eliminated altogether and replaced by a wage-adjustment trigger 
without a cap. The threat of  setting off the ocala movel led to efforts to purge the 
price index at a significant cost to credibility. Financial assets were indexed to the 
short-term interest rate in November because expectations had turned adverse. 
Such setting led to a highly volatile atmosphere  in which inflationary expectations 
easily became the driving mechanism for actual inflation. The sharp deceleration 
of  inflation in  mid-1986 was thus replaced by  an explosion of  prices at the 
beginning of  1987. 
The third lesson concerns the debt overhang. In 1964 it was irrelevant. In 
1986 it was prominent. There was much less margin for maneuver in order 
to finance government deficits in a noninflationary fashion. There was less 
import capacity to make up  for domestic shortages or to  make long-term 
investment and  technological updating attractive.  There was  no  ability- 
even with initially abundant international reserves-to  use the international 
accounts to compensate for internal excess demand. The death knell of  the 
Cruzado Plan was, not surprisingly, sounded by  the moratorium on external 
interest payments. 
5  External Debt, Budget 
Deficits, and Inflation 
In January 1987 Brazil faced an external debt of  $103 billion, amounting to 
more than one-third of  GDP. Debt service requirements remained onerous, 
and a precarious trade balance was on the verge of provoking a moratorium. 
The inflation front did not look any better. Table 5.1 shows the numbers for 